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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE GOALS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN MISSOURI: THE
STATE’S INTEREST IN REGULATING MARRIAGE, PRIVATIZING
DEPENDENCY, AND ALLOWING SAME-SEX DIVORCE

I. INTRODUCTION
As of October 2012, almost 20 percent of the United States allows samesex marriage1 and more than 150,000 same-sex couples have reported being
married.2 However, the majority of the United States, including Missouri,3 still
define marriage as the union of one man and one woman.4 In theory, since it is
the public policy of Missouri not to allow same-sex marriage,5 Missouri should
support a couples’ decision to end a same-sex marriage by getting a divorce.
However, granting a divorce could be seen as giving legal effect to the samesex marriage. One concern is that recognizing a same-sex marriage, no matter
the purpose, will eventually result in the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Although Missouri is not required to recognize same-sex marriages granted by
other states, by refusing to grant a divorce Missouri is literally requiring the
same-sex couple to stay married in the nine other jurisdictions that do
recognize the marriage. This paradox should compel the state of Missouri to
consider adopting a policy that allows for the dissolution of same-sex
marriages. Moreover, as this Note demonstrates, a public policy allowing
same-sex divorce would not be incompatible with Missouri’s policy to not
allow same-sex marriage.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II looks beyond an individual’s right
to marriage or divorce and considers the public policy goals of marriage and
divorce from the state’s point of view. This part demonstrates that the state’s
role in regulating marriage is very different from its role in regulating divorce,
but the state’s goal in regulating marriage and divorce is substantially the
same—to protect society by promoting family and privatizing dependency.

1. See PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE: SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE & RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (THE STORY IN MAPS) 3 (2011); see
also infra Part III.A.
2. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex
Married Couples (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/ar
chives/2010_census/cb11-cn181.html.
3. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 33 (“That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall
exist only between a man and a woman.”).
4. NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 1, at 3.
5. See id.
447
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Part III of this Note assesses the present day status of the legal recognition of
same-sex marriages throughout the country; the role of the Defense of
Marriage Act, which allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages
legally contracted in other states; and the practical problem this creates for
states that do not legally recognize same-sex marriages. This part then
considers three approaches to the same-sex divorce problem: (1) complete nonrecognition of same-sex relationships, (2) an equitable approach to same-sex
relationships, and (3) recognizing same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of
divorce. Lastly, Part IV of this Note will consider Missouri’s public policy not
to allow same-sex marriage and which of the three options listed infra is most
consistent with the public policy of Missouri. In conclusion, this Note will
demonstrate that recognizing a same-sex marriage for the purpose of granting a
same-sex divorce would efficiently dissolve same-sex marriages in a way that
optimally benefits society while protecting Missouri’s interest in regulating
who can enter and exit marriage. Thus, Missouri should adopt a policy that
allows courts to grant same-sex divorces regardless of whether or not Missouri
allows same-sex marriage.
II. BACKGROUND: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
A.

Marriage: A Social Practice, Legal Status, Civil Contract, and Institution

In 1888, the Supreme Court defined marriage as an “institution,” that is
“the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress.”6 It is “a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”7 In
Missouri, a marriage is considered both a “contract” and “status or legal
condition.”8 But unlike other contracts, where the parties might negotiate their
own terms, in a marriage contract the state sets the terms.9 Likewise, marriage
is more than a contract; it is the legal creation of a family.10 Marriage is also a

6. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating that marriage “is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.”).
8. Nelson v. Marshall, 869 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
9. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 (“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life,
as having more to do with the morality and civilization of a people than any other institution, has
always been subject to the control of the legislature. The body prescribes the age at which parties
may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and
obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and the
acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.”).
10. SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 10 (2003).
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“status,” or rather a “social practice,” that is defined by rules.11 The legal
duties, responsibilities, and rights that accompany marriage are based on the
needs, norms, values, and beliefs of society.12 In this way, the definition of
marriage changes over time. For instance, in 1990 Black’s Law Dictionary
defined marriage as the “legal status, condition, or relation of one man and one
woman united in law for life, or until divorced.”13 Yet, the 2009 edition of
Black's Law Dictionary defines marriage as “[t]he legal union of a couple as
spouses.”14 Also, the definition of a “family” or “marriage” varies from
country to country. For instance, in some countries marriage is limited to two
people, but in other countries marriages may involve more than two people.15
1. The Purpose of Marriage for the Individual and Benefits for Society
In the United States, people get married “in every region, every social
class, every race and ethnicity,” and “every religion or non-religion.”16 For an
individual, the traditional purpose of marriage is to form a family.17
Historically, the main function of the family unit has been survival.18 Thus, the
social practice of “family” revolved around having children or caring for the
needs of children19 because otherwise “most children would not survive their
infancy.”20 Still today, individuals are very dependent on their families. For
instance, the legal term “dependent” describes a child, spouse, or other family
member who is “not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else.”21 Thus, ideally, young people are dependent not on the
government, but on independent family units who have the ultimate

11. LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAMILY LAW 26
(1988).
12. Id.
13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (6th ed. 1990).
14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1058 (9th ed. 2009) (elaborating that a valid marriage
requires “(1) parties legally capable of contracting to marry, (2) mutual consent or agreement, and
(3) an actual contracting in the form prescribed by law.”).
15. This practice is known as both polygamy and bygamy, for a discussion of polygamy
around the world see MIRIAM K. ZEITZEN, POLYGAMY: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS
69 (2008).
16. Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 668 (2010) (exploring
the meaning of marriage and the right to marry).
17. See HOULGATE, supra note 11, at 92–104.
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 503 (9th ed. 2009) (noting that “a taxpayer may be able to
claim a personal exemption if the taxpayer provides more than half of the person’s support during
the taxable year.”).
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responsibility of teaching them how to be effective and productive members of
society.22
The family also serves as “a business, a school, a vocational instate, a
church, house of corrections, and a welfare institution.”23 Thus, “the institution
of marriage serves an unbelievably important societal function, transmitting
both life and culture to the next generation.”24 Everyone benefits from the role
marriage plays in the self-preservation of society.25 In fact, there are many
general health benefits related to marriage. For instance:
[M]arried adults are less likely than non-married adults to abuse alcohol,
drugs, and other addictive substances. Married parties take fewer mortal and
moral risks, even fewer when they have children. They live longer by several
years. They are less likely to attempt or to commit suicide. They enjoy more
regular, safe, and satisfying sex. They amass and transmit greater per capita
wealth. They receive better personal health care and hygiene. They provide and
receive more effective co-insurance and sharing of labor. They are more
efficient in discharging essential domestic tasks. They enjoy greater overall
satisfaction with life measured in a variety of ways. . . . Most children reared in
two-parent households perform better in their socialization, education, and
26
development than their peers reared in single- or no-parent homes.

Of course, marriage also provides individuals with a sense of security, love,
and companionship, but there are also thousands of state and federal legal
benefits provided by marriage.27 There are tax benefits to being married,28
testimonial privileges,29 immigration rights, rights in adoption, custody, and
visitation, the ability to access the health and retirement benefits of a spouse,
the ability to make medical decisions for an ill spouse, and the right to sue for
wrongful death of a spouse, just to name a few.30 The benefits are offered to

22. See Lynn D. Wardle, Parenthood and the Limits of Adult Autonomy, 24 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 169, 172 (2005).
23. HOULGATE, supra note 11, at 31.
24. John Eastman, The Constitutionality of Traditional Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 24,
2011, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-constitutionality-of-traditional-mar
riage/.
25. HOULGATE, supra note 11, at 17.
26. John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019,
1019–20 (2001) (footnotes removed) (noting that “[m]en, on average, enjoy more of these health
benefits of marriage than women.”).
27. ABA Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding SameSex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 366 (2004).
28. For discussion of federal tax of the property of married couples, and “the transfer of
property from deceased spouse to surviving spouse”, see Mary M. Wenig, Taxing Marriage, 6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 561, 561 (1997).
29. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (discussing the marital privilege
of refusing to testify against a spouse).
30. See Nussbaum, supra note 16, at 669.
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promote marriage, and encourage people to stay married, and form stable
families.31
Starting a family also comes with certain legal obligations. For instance, in
Missouri, before the state will provide welfare or other financial support to a
family the state will first charge the father for back child support.32 Also, it is a
crime to physically or emotionally abuse a child or domestic partner.33
Likewise, upon death it is assumed that one’s entire estate will go to his or her
family, and, in fact, unless an individual has specified an intention otherwise
the estate automatically goes to the family.34 By ensuring that dependents are
supported financially, the state allows them to remain self-sufficient, thus
relieving the rest of society from the burden of taking care of those individuals.
When the benefits of marriage are compared with the duties and obligations
that the legal system imposes on marriages and families, it seems that they
both serve the same purpose—to encourage people to take care of their
families.35
The concepts of “independence” and “responsible parenthood” both have
deep roots in Western civilization.36 Cultural anthropologists believe that all
societies provide their members with “root paradigms,” meaning personal,
familial, and social identities reflecting underlying assumptions about “the
very nature of existence.”37 In the United States, the root paradigm of
“autonomy,” meaning personal independence, is especially pronounced and
has strongly influenced the development of American family law.38 The family
is encouraged to “privately” raise children in a “self-contained and self-

31. HOULGATE, supra note 11, at 7–8 (comparing the goals and purposes of types of family
law policies, which confer “benefits or burdens” on members of society, to the goals and
purposes behind other types of laws, for instance penal laws, which serve to punish wrongdoers
and, therefore, deter bad behavior).
32. MO. REV. STAT. § 454.465 (2000) (“[A] payment of public assistance by the division of
family services to or for the benefit of any dependent child . . . creates an obligation, to be called
“state debt”, which is due and owing to the department by the parent, or parents, absent from the
home where the dependent child resided at the time the public assistance was paid.”).
33. See §§ 568.045, 565.072–74 (2000 & Supp. 2011).
34. See § 474.010 (2000) (describing procedure for distributing property of a decedent who
dies intestate—if no children, the surviving spouse receives the entire estate, if children, the
surviving spouse and the children split the estate).
35. HOULGATE, supra note 11, at 7–8 (comparing the goals and purposes of types of family
law policies, which confer “benefits or burdens” on members of society to the goals and purposes
behind other types of laws, for instance penal laws, which serve to punish wrong-doers and
therefore deter bad behavior).
36. Wardle, supra note 22, at 171.
37. Id. at 169–71 (citing Merlin G. Myers, The Morality of Kinship, Speech at the Virginia
F. Cutler Lecture (Nov. 15, 1983), in BYU SPEECHES OF THE YEAR, 1983–84, at 45 (1984)).
38. Id.
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sufficient unit without demanding public resources to do so.”39 When the
private family succeeds it is rewarded with protection and freedom from the
state intervention.40 And for many Americans, resorting to the state for
financial support would be considered a failure.41 In this way, society allocates
the “inevitable dependency” of children onto the private family, thus, directing
dependency away from the state and “privatizing” it.42
2. The State’s Interest in Marriage
Recognition of the government’s interest in promoting and regulating
marriage dates back to the days of Aristotle who, seeking to ensure that marital
couples would remain “bonded together for the sake of their children,”
prescribed a whole series of laws relating to “the ideal ages, qualities, and
duties of husband and wife to each other and to their children.”43 However, it
was not until 1753 that the English civil law actually took regulatory control of
marriage in any effective way.44 In 1877, the Supreme Court considered the
now famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff and explained that the state has an
“absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation
between its own citizens shall be created and the causes for which it may be
dissolved.”45 This has to do with a state’s right to determine the status of its
citizens and “to prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them
may be commenced and carried on within its territory.”46 In 1888, the Supreme
Court again explained that the public was “deeply interested” in the
maintenance of “the institution of marriage” as it is “the foundation of the
family and of society.”47 Likewise, in Missouri, marriage “is considered so
important to society that the courts uniformly hold that the state is an interested
party.”48
Thus, the state of Missouri “has a legitimate and rightful concern with
persons domiciled within its borders in relation to marriage,”49 and the state
legislature is charged with regulating marriage based on promoting “the

39. Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81
VA. L. REV. 2181, 2205 (1995).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Witte, Jr., supra note 26, at 1024.
44. Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage-The Theoretical Perspective, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 93, 95 (2003) (discussing the history of The Marriage Act of 1753 and its continued effect
on the regulation of marriage).
45. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1877) (overruled on other grounds).
46. Id. at 734.
47. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
48. Heil v. Rogers, 329 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
49. Nelson v. Marshall, 869 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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general welfare of its citizens.”50 As the preferences of those with direct or
indirect power to influence policy change,51 so does the state’s “interest” in
regulating marriage. With the “general welfare of the citizens” in mind, the
state of Missouri has imposed a variety of limitations on who may “enter”
marriage. For example, certain types of blood relatives cannot marry;52
individuals must reach a certain age before they can marry;53 and a person
cannot be married to more than one person at a time.54 Of course, in order to
regulate these restrictions couples seeking to marry are also first required to
obtain a marriage license.55
Although the state has imposed many regulations regarding who may enter
marriage, once a marriage is formed the state does very little to regulate family
life. In fact, over the past fifty years, dominant family law policy has included
the emergence of a constitutional doctrine of privacy and the enactment of
unilateral, no-fault divorce laws both of which tend to encourage autonomy
and self-reliance over government involvement.56 This reflects the state’s
interest in the privatization57 of dependency in the family.58 Even the Supreme
Court has observed the role the institution of marriage has played in
“developing the decentralized structure of our democratic society.”59

50. JOHN D. GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 2 (2d ed. 2001).
51. Bix, supra note 44, at 107–08 (explaining that the term “state’s interest” actually refers
to a “judgment regarding the state’s interest made by a majority of legislators along with the
governor.”).
52. MO. REV. STAT. § 451.020 (2000) (“All marriages between parents and children,
including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the
half as well as the whole blood, between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, first cousins, and
between persons who lack capacity to enter into a marriage contract, are presumptively void.”).
53. § 451.090 (stating that, in Missouri, no one under the age of fifteen may marry, and
people under the age of eighteen need their parents’ permission).
54. § 451.030 (“All marriages, where either of the parties has a former wife or husband
living, shall be void, unless the former marriage shall have been dissolved.”).
55. § 451.040 (stating marriage license applications require a valid social security number in
Missouri).
56. Id.
57. See Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of
Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 418 (2005) (“Privatization
overwhelmingly refers to the delegation of once governmental services to the private sector—
specifically, to the market (private enterprise) and the voluntary sector (non-profit charitable
actors).”); but see Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1507, 1508 (2001) (“Movement from public to private is not absolutely necessary,
because something may be called privatized even if it always has been private, merely because it
is publicly administered in another jurisdiction.”).
58. Wardle, supra note 22, at 171.
59. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (“In recognition of that role, and as part of
their general overarching concern for serving the best interests of children, state laws almost
universally express an appropriate preference for the formal family.”).
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Still, in many ways, privatization itself is just “another form of
regulation.”60 Both “child support and welfare eligibility reform share a basic
objective of privatizing the costs of raising families, by transferring
responsibility from the state to the family.”61 In 2002, President Bush's welfare
reform proposals were discussed in a press release in which the President
“emphasized that one of the goals would be to encourage the formation and
maintenance of two parent married families and responsible fatherhood.”62 In
Missouri, when a woman files for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) if she is not already receiving child support from the child’s father the
state will find the father and charge him with child support in the form of “state
debt.”63
The state’s interest in protecting families and privatizing obligations goes
beyond family and domestic relations law and is enmeshed throughout all
types of law. For example, in the Criminal Law context the “Castle Doctrine,”
also known as “defense of habitation,”64 generally states that those who are
unlawfully attacked in their homes have no duty to retreat. Instead, they may
lawfully stand their ground and use deadly force if necessary to prevent
imminent death, great bodily injury, or the commission of a forcible felony.65
Thus, “homicide may be justified as a defense of habitation.”66
As described by the Vermont Supreme Court in 1873, the idea embodied in
the expression “a man's house is his castle” is not that it is his property, but
that the house has a peculiar immunity because it is “sacred for the protection
of his person and of his family.”67 For instance, in Missouri a person can use
deadly force in defense of a family member if they reasonably believe deadly
force is necessary to protect that person from death, serious physical injury, or

60. Daniel A. Farber, Whither Socialism?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1996).
61. Cossman, supra note 57, at 440–41.
62. Bix, supra note 44, at 101 (citing Press Release, The White House, Working Toward
Independence 19 (Feb. 2002), http://www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2002/02/welfare-book-02.html).
63. MO. REV. STAT. § 454.465 (2000) (“[A] payment of public assistance by the division of
family services to or for the benefit of any dependent child . . . creates an obligation, to be called
‘state debt’, which is due and owing to the department by the parent, or parents, absent from the
home where the dependent child resided at the time the public assistance was paid.”).
64. See State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing the
difference between defense of self and defense of habitation); see also State v. Clinch, 335
S.W.3d 579, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he ‘castle doctrine’ . . . merely codified that the
unlawful entry into a dwelling, residence, or vehicle constitutes the act of force necessary to
justify deadly force.”) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Supp. 2011).
65. Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86
MARQ. L. REV. 653, 656–57 (2003) (emphasis added).
66. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 776 (emphasis added).
67. State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 320–21 (Vt. 1873) (emphasis added).
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any forcible felony.68 However, the use of deadly force in the defense of others
has been limited to persons in familial relationships to the actor.69 This
suggests that the state values the duty to care for one’s family so highly that
ensuring the safety of one’s family can justify the murder of another person.70
3. Exceptions to Traditional Marriage Law
The field of domestic relations is “an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States.”71 However, a state’s right to
regulate marital relations is not absolute, as there are constitutional parameters
to a state’s ability to regulate family law.72
a. The Right to Marry
There are times when one state recognizes a form of marriage when
another state, for public policy reasons, does not recognize that form of
marriage. An “evasive marriage” is when a couple attempts to evade their
home state’s marriage laws by going to another state just for the purpose of
marrying since they know they could not get married in their home state.73 The
traditional rule for recognition of out-of-state or foreign marriages is that if the
marriage is valid where it was “celebrated” it will be valid everywhere.74
However, states reserve the right to refuse to recognize “foreign” marriages if
they are contrary to the state’s strong public policy.75

68. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Supp. 2011).
69. State v. Kennedy, 106 S.W. 57, 58–60 (Mo. 1907) (holding that relationship of
unmarried cohabitants was not close enough of a relationship to justify man committing homicide
in defense of the woman).
70. See id. at 59–60.
71. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 298 (1942) (“Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital
status of persons domiciled within its borders.”).
72. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (“In some cases, however, this Court has
held that the Federal Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for
certain formal family relationships. In those cases, as in the state cases, the Court has emphasized
the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a
counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.”).
73. Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and
Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87, 111–12
(2004) (noting that evasive marriage involves “obtaining a legal status that is not and, in the
opinion of many, should not be available elsewhere.”).
74. Constitutional Constraints on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2028, 2035 (2003).
75. Brian H. Bix, State Interests in Marriage, Interstate Recognition, and Choice of Law, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 337, 341 (2005) (“[U]nder traditional conflict of laws rules, states have the
right to refuse to recognize marriages celebrated in another state or country, if that marriage is
contrary to the forum state’s strong public policy.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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Historical examples of reasons for denying recognition to out-of-state or
foreign marriages have included “prohibitions against bigamy and polygamy,
consanguinity or affinity, nonage, miscegenation, and certain instances of
remarriage after divorce.”76 This so-called “public policy exception” has
encouraged the formation of statutes outlining the public policy of the state by
defining what relationships did or did not constitute a lawful marriage—thus,
allowing courts to invalidate a foreign marriage when it violated a public
policy statute.77 Although the citizens of a state may feel strongly about
prohibiting a certain type of marriage, there are limits to a state’s ability to ban
certain types of marriage or prevent certain classes of people from marrying.
For instance, in 1967 the Supreme Court held that a state could not limit an
individual’s right to marry based on race.78 Although the Constitution does not
expressly address the right to marry, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court held that
marriage was one of the most “basic civil rights of man” and, thus, a liberty
interest protected by the Constitution.79 It is noteworthy that although this case
is now commonly cited as outlining a right to marry,80 the case was never
about the couple’s right to marry in a state. But rather the right to have the
couple’s lawful out-of-state marriage recognized by the state where they
lived.81 In Loving, the state of Virginia had passed a statute banning interracial
marriage—the Racial Integrity Act of 1924.82 Two Virginia residents, Mildred
Loving, a woman of Native American and African decent, and Richard
Loving, a Caucasian, were not allowed to get married in Virginia, so they went
to the District of Columbia to get married.83 When the couple returned to
Virginia the state not only refused to recognize their marriage, but they were
arrested and charged with committing miscegenation84 in violation of the
Racial Integrity Act of 1924.85

CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 289–95 (4th ed. 2001).
76. Constitutional Constraints on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, supra note 74,
at 2035–36.
77. Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public Policy
Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 116
(2010).
78. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
79. Id.
80. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2087 (2005).
81. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 2.
84. The mixing of different racial groups through marriage, cohabitation, or sexual relations.
Miscegenation Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/miscegena
tion (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
85. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3, 6.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that marriage was one of the
basic civil rights of man, “fundamental to our very existence and survival,” and
that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by racial discrimination.86
Although the right to marry is commonly considered from the individual’s
point of view, there are also broader public policy reasons for encouraging and
promoting marriage by viewing marriage as a private right.87 Even the Court’s
reasoning, that the ability to enter a marriage is a private, individual right,
reflects an underlying belief in an individual’s independence and autonomy.88
b. Domestic Violence and Marital Privacy
Privacy within the sanctity of home is well established in the field of
domestic relations. It is often said that “[n]o more confidential relation is
known to the law than that of husband and wife.”89 However, the home “is not
just a physical place [it] is imbued with idealized characteristics. . . . It fosters
intimate relationships and allows family life to flourish. It is also a place of
safety and physical comfort.”90 Thus, when the home is safe and family life is
flourishing, the state rewards the family freedom from state intervention.91
However, when the home is not safe, the state interferes based on the “high
commitment of individuals and societies to the welfare of children and
posterity.”92 Thus, although marriage is typically considered private, domestic
violence is so inconsistent with the public policy justification for respecting
marital privacy (promoting stable families) that the state must intervene.93 All
states, including Missouri, have laws protecting children from excessive
punishment and prohibiting other forms of domestic violence such as spousal
abuse.94 The state will not only temporarily remove a child from their family
home if the family unit is not adequately providing for the child, but the state
has the power to completely terminate parental rights.95 Additionally, there are
86. Id. at 12.
87. Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 668 (2010).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Hickman v. Link, 10 S.W. 600, 607 (Mo. 1889).
90. Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home is His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence
and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 88–89 (2004) (examining the role of
privacy in domestic violence cases).
91. Fineman, supra note 39, at 2205.
92. Wardle, supra note 22, at 169.
93. See also Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence
on Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757, 786 (1996).
94. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.005–455.549 (2012); see also Mund v. Mund, 7 S.W.3d 401,
403 n.4 (Mo. 1999) (“[D]omestic violence includes not only physical but also sexual abuse of
household or family members.”).
95. See, e.g., §§ 211.442–211.477 (2000); see also Haddix, supra note 93, at 786 (noting that
“[t]ermination statutes, by their very nature, are prospective and predictive in nature. Their
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criminal sanctions for abusing or endangering a child96 or a spouse.97 The
court’s limited involvement in marriage occurs only when necessary to ensure
that the family members are properly protecting and caring for each other.
This Part has considered the overall purpose of marriage and the state’s
interest in marriage, specifically looking at Missouri statutes and case law.
Analyzing both traditional marriage doctrine and its exceptions, Missouri’s
public policy is consistent with other parts of the United States in that it
reflects an underlying belief in autonomy, independence, and an overall policy
of privatizing dependency through the encouragement of marriage and family.
Similarly, Section B of this Part will consider the state’s interest in divorce,
focusing on Missouri’s public policy related to divorce.
B.

Divorce: No-Fault, Equitable Distribution, and Independence

Like any other contract or transaction, marriages do not always go as
planned. Yet, unlike other contracts, which can be suspended by the parties,
marriage is a “distinctive” legal relationship that may not be terminated
without the consent of the State.98 According to Black’s Legal Dictionary, a
divorce is simply “[t]he legal dissolution of a marriage by a court.”99 Yet,
divorce law necessarily “includes principles of constitutional law, property
law, contract law, tort law, civil procedure, statutory regulations, equitable
remedies, and of course, marital property and support rights.”100
As a matter of jurisdiction, a divorce can occur “in any state in which one
of the two spouses is domiciled.”101 The term domicile is generally equivalent
to the term residence.102 To establish residency for dissolution purposes in
Missouri, “a plaintiff must show actual personal presence in the new place and
the intention to remain there, either permanently or for an indefinite time,
without any fixed or certain purpose to return to the former place of abode.”103
In Missouri, a judgment of dissolution of marriage will only be granted if (1)
purpose is not to punish parents for past behavior, but rather to prevent future harm to children by
interpreting past behavior as indicative of future parental unfitness.”).
96. See MO. REV. STAT. § 568.045 (2012) (“Endangering the welfare of a child . . . is a class
C felony.”).
97. In Missouri, first degree domestic assault is a class B felony; second degree domestic
assault is a class C felony; and third degree domestic assault is a class A misdemeanor. MO. REV.
STAT. §565.072-074 (2012).
98. Laurence D. Borten, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1089, 1127 (2002).
99. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (9th ed. 2009).
100. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.
101. Bix, supra note 75, at 342.
102. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.305 (2012); see also Lewis v. Lewis, 930 S.W.2d 475, 477
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that “the term ‘residence’ as used in § 452.305 is equivalent to the
legal concept of ‘domicile.’”).
103. Lewis, 903 S.W.2d at 477.
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one of the parties has been a resident of the state for ninety days prior to the
proceeding; (2) the court finds that there remains no reasonable likelihood that
the marriage can be preserved and that, therefore, the marriage is irretrievably
broken; and (3) the court has considered and made provision for the
maintenance of either spouse and the disposition of property.104 Importantly, a
dissolution of marriage entered in a state that neither party is domiciled will
result in the decree being void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.105
1. The Purpose and Benefits of Divorce for the Individual and Society
An often overlooked benefit to having a legally recognized relationship is
the right to access the courts in order to dissolve that relationship if the need
arises.106 From the individuals’ perspective, there are numerous benefits to
getting a divorce. Many of these same rights and obligations guaranteed in a
divorce are considered unenforceable, under the doctrine of “family privacy”,
if brought by parties still in an intact marriage.107 Basically, a divorce allows
parties to enforce their marital rights, for instance “(1) the distribution and taxpreferential transfer of property between spouses, (2) the right to seek spousal
support . . . (3) the right to seek custody and visitation rights for children of the
marriage, and (4) preferential treatment for claims made under a divorce
decree by former spouses in bankruptcy court.”108 Other legal benefits of
divorce include the ability to remarry later. And since both parties need not be
willing to divorce,109 an individual may ask the court to exercise jurisdiction
over the unwilling party.110 After the divorce, parties have the right to enforce
these “court orders,” even if the opposing parties resists following the plan.111

104. § 452.305 .
105. Lewis, 903 S.W.2d at 477.
106. See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1449
(discussing ways in which “the law traditionally privileged marriage over nonmarital intimate
relationships . . . by denying unmarried cohabitants access to the judicial system for resolving
financial disputes arising out of their relationship.”).
107. Bix, supra note 44, at 104.
108. Colleen M. Ramais, ‘til Death Do You Part . . . and This Time We Mean It: Denial of
Access to Divorce for Same-Sex Couples, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1024 (2010).
109. Grossman, supra note 73, at 115.
110. As long as the other party was properly served with notice, the court will enter a default
judgment. See Hayes v. Hayes, 671 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Mo. App. Ct. 1984) (noting that “strict
rules pertaining to default judgments are less rigorously applied in dissolution cases, especially in
matters involving child custody”).
111. See MO. REV. STAT. § 511.340 (2000) (“When a judgment requires the performance of
any other act than the payment of money . . . his obedience thereto required. If he neglect or
refuse, he may be punished by the court as for a contempt, by fine or imprisonment, or both, and,
if necessary, by sequestration of property.”).
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2. The State’s Interest in Divorce
The National Conference on Uniform State Laws provided a model
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1970.112 This Act suggests the
underlying purpose of dissolution laws, reflecting that the state has an interest
in:
[P]romot[ing] the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between
parties to a marriage; mitigat[ing] the potential harm to the spouses and their
children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage; mak[ing]
reasonable provision for spouse and minor children during and after litigation;
and mak[ing] the law of legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with
113
the realities of matrimonial experience.

This demonstrates the fact that, unlike marriage laws that promote marriage,
efforts to simplify the dissolution process were not meant to encourage or
promote divorce. Rather, the State has an interest in ensuring that all members
of the family are provided for throughout the divorce process.114 At first look,
divorce may seem very different from marriage in that marriage creates a
family, whereas a divorce proceeding ends a family. However, the state’s
ultimate interest in divorce is to reduce the negative impact of the divorce on
all members of the family.115 In this way, the state’s interest in regulating
divorce is very similar to its interest in regulating marriage, in that the ultimate
goal is to protect and promote the overall well-being of the family.116
However, family members are at great risk when a marriage is ending, so the
state plays an even greater role in regulating divorce than in regulating
marriage. For instance, the state respects the privacy of the marriage and
family home so much that it will not get involved in an intact marriage until
the relationship between the parties has become physically dangerous.117
However, at divorce, the veil of privacy is lifted and the state not only
intervenes, but also completely delves into the personal lives of the parties. For
instance, courts have gone so far as to require parties to disclose their
Facebook passwords to the court!118

112. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 101–506 (1973).
113. Id. § 102.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Cossman, supra note 57, at 429-30.
117. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (describing the “sanctity of a
man’s home and the privacies of life”); but see People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y.
1984) (observing that the “right of privacy protects consensual acts, not violent sexual assaults.”).
118. Gallion v. Gallion, No. FA1141169555, 2011 WL 4953451, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 30, 2011) (ordering that “[c]ounsel for each party shall exchange the password(s) of their
client’s Facebook and dating website passwords” in the context of a dissolution proceeding).
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Next, this section will discuss how the state’s interest in protecting families
has influenced divorce law in the United States, specifically considering the
purpose of no-fault divorce, the equitable distribution of property, and
privatizing dependency.
a. No-Fault Divorce
For the past decade, the divorce rate in America has been around 50
percent.119 However, historically the public policy in the United States “placed
considerable value on the institution of marriage and . . . discouraged divorce
except in extreme circumstances.”120 In fact, until the late 1960s, American
law recognized no such thing as a consensual divorce.121 Rather, each state had
established specific grounds for terminating a marriage based on the spouse
seeking a divorce proving to the court that the other spouse committed a
marital offense or fault.122 Thus, divorce was “a privilege granted by the state
to an innocent spouse” against a guilty spouse.123 This approach is known as a
fault-based system of divorce.124 Critics of that system felt that divorce should
not be based solely on traditional fault grounds such as adultery, cruelty, or
desertion. But, instead, “viewed as a regrettable, but necessary, legal definition
of a marital failure.”125 Therefore, factors leading to the break down of the
marriage were not based on the fault of one party, rather the incompatibility
and irreconcilable differences of both spouses. Perhaps the most significant
effect of fault-based divorce on the legal system was that unhappy couples
“would have to fabricate various fault grounds for divorce and resort to
perjury, often with the assistance of their legal counsel.”126
With the intent of remedying these perceived shortcomings inherent in the
fault-based system, no-fault divorce legislation was introduced to the United
States in the 1960s and 1970s.127 Widespread divorce law reform took place in
the United States culminating in a “divorce revolution” and by 1985 all states
had adopted some form of no-fault divorce.128 This move from fault-based to
no-fault divorce represented a shift in family law from public to private

119. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Most People Make Only One Trip Down the Aisle,
But First Marriages Shorter (Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/re
leases/archives/marital_status_living_arrangements/cb07-131.html.
120. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 50, at 222.
121. Singer, supra note 106, at 1470.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1470–71.
124. Peter N. Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269,
270 (1997).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 271.
128. Id.
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through the literal “privatization of divorce and its financial consequences.”129
Where the fault-based divorce system required the state to determine whether
or not a couple could divorce, the no-fault system allows for divorce based on
a private decision by both spouses or by one spouse acting unilaterally.130
Thus, in the case of divorce, it is not the entry to marriage that is viewed as a
fundamental right, rather the right to exit the marriage is considered a
fundamental right.
In true no-fault jurisdictions all that needs to be shown is that the marriage
is irretrievably broken.131 Although the state of Missouri has not enacted “a
total ‘no fault’ dissolution law. . . . [it has] adopted a ‘modified no fault’
dissolution law.”132 In Missouri, the court must find that there remains no
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved, and therefore the
marriage is irretrievably broken.133 However, proving that the marriage is in
fact irretrievably broken can be established by merely showing behavior
indicating financial and communication incompatibility.134
Since the rise of the no-fault divorce in the 1970’s, scholars have observed
an increase in the number of divorces taking place.135 While some believe that
high divorce rates are attributable to no-fault divorce laws damaging the
institution of marriage,136 there are many persuasive arguments demonstrating
that no-fault divorce has actually strengthened the institution of marriage. One
scholar has hypothesized that no-fault divorce simply represents the shifting
value of property rights in marriage and divorce, noting that fault-based
divorce gave each spouse the property right to continued marriage whereas nofault divorce gives each spouse a property right to divorce.137 Historically, one
spouse risked losing financial resources or property through divorce, thus it

129. Singer, supra note 106, at 1445.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 545 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
133. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (outlining grounds for dissolution in
Missouri).
134. See In re Marriage of McCurdy, 233 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
marriage was irretrievably broken based on Husband’s “brief synopsis” of financial and
communication incompatibility, although Wife argued this was not sufficient evidence, the court
reasoned there was “no reason . . . to delve into the parties’ incompatibility.”).
135. See Swisher, supra note 124, 271 (1997).
136. Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 741, 742 (arguing that no-fault divorce “culture has spawned a powerful ‘culture of conflict’
that fosters and produces violence.”).
137. Martin Zelder, The Economic Analysis of the Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law on the
Divorce Rate, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 241, 247, 249 (1993) (arguing that, overtime,
“[r]egardless of the law, marriage will continue when the surplus from marriage is positive, and
divorce will occur when the surplus from marriage is negative.”).
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may have been more valuable for the marriage to continue.138 However, a
modern approach to the allocation of resources at divorce recognizes
contributions beyond financial ones—thus, the act of leaving a marriage is
viewed as a property right.139 Moreover, even if no-fault divorce law has made
divorce easier, it has never discouraged marriage.140 To the contrary, no fault
divorce may indirectly encourage marriage by promising individuals that their
sacrifices within marriage will have a substantial return.141 Divorce provides
both parties with the right to remarry and statistics reflect that divorcees
throughout the United States are comfortable re-marrying and very likely to do
so.142
b. Equitable Division of the Partnership
One goal of divorce is to equitably divide marital property and other
assets.143 In this sense, the marriage is treated much like a business partnership
with a presumption of equal division upon divorce.144 One underlying
philosophy supporting the equal division of property at divorce is
individualism, which “as a policy has strong roots in America's self-image as a
land of opportunity in which hard work receives a just reward.”145 Based on
this philosophy, property is divided at dissolution with the goal of
compensating each spouse for the contributions they made to the marriage.146
Thus, a “spouse who made more overall contributions should receive more
property, while a spouse who contributed little is entitled only to a small
award.”147 While the meaning of a contribution varies from state to state, it
usually includes any significant expenditure of resources or time, notably
including homemaker and child-rearing contributions.148
The ideal property division system would award each party a share of the
marital estate that would be (1) fair in amount; (2) easy to compute; (3)
predictable from the facts; and (4) consistent in similar cases.149 This stems

138. See id. at 246.
139. See id. at 249.
140. See id. at 242, 247–49.
141. See id. at 247–49.
142. Larry Bumpass et al., Changing Patterns of Remarriage, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 747,
750 (1990).
143. Swisher, supra 124, at 297.
144. Bix, supra note 44, at 99–100.
145. Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property § 2:2, 41 A.L.R. FED. 481, 481
(2005).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (noting that “there is still a tendency to place special emphasis upon direct financial
contributions.”).
149. Id.
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from the basic notion of equity implying that cases with similar facts should
reach similar results.150 If this goal of equity is not met, unlucky litigants resent
the system and often attempt to avoid complying with the court's order.151 But
fair, predictable, and consistent results also provide individuals with notice of
how their case might turn out.152 Inconsistent results frustrate parties and can
lead to an “increase in litigation, with correspondingly greater costs to both the
parties and the public.” Lastly, the state has an interest in not only providing
uniform results, but in creating a property division system that is easy to
administer.153
c. Ensuring Self-Sufficient Status and Privatizing Dependency
Another important goal “of a dissolution decree is to place each of the
former spouses in an independent self-sufficient status.”154 Although alimony
and maintenance awards are also options, most states “primarily rely on the
division of marital property in order to satisfy the economic needs of a
separating couple.”155 And while courts do “not favor awards of maintenance
to former spouses,” they can still provide an award of maintenance if a spouse
cannot otherwise support himself or herself after the property division is
complete.156
In Missouri, Revised Statute § 452.330 outlines the factors the court should
consider when dividing property in a proceeding for dissolution.157 These
factors include the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
property division is to become effective; contributions of each spouse to
acquisition of marital property—including the contribution of a spouse as
homemaker; and the value of the non-marital property set apart to each
spouse.158 Essentially, “[t]wo principles . . . guide marital property division.
. . . [F]irst, the property division should reflect the concept of marriage as a
shared enterprise similar to a partnership; second, the property division should
be utilized as a means of providing future support for an economically

150. Id.
151. Turner, supra note 145, at 481.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. In re Marriage of Torix, 863 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
155. Mark H. Kruger & Marc J. Boxerman, Maintanance: Rehabilitation Aid or Lifetime
Annuity? Termination of Maintenance and the Obligation to Work, 52 J. MO. B. 223, 224 (1996).
156. See id.
157. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (2012).
158. Id. (noting that other factors include “[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage;
and . . . [c]ustodial arrangements for minor children.”).
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dependent spouse.”159 This implies that one of the main purposes of property
division is to ensure that each spouse will be economically self-sufficient.
Moreover, after the division of marital property, if the court finds that one
spouse “[l]acks sufficient property . . . to provide for his [or her] reasonable
needs” and is “unable to support [his or her self] through appropriate
employment,” the court may award maintenance or alimony.160 Factors for the
court to consider when determining the amount and duration of a maintenance
order include: “The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training
to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; . . .
The comparative earning capacity of each spouse; . . . [And] [t]he age, and the
physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance[.]”161
Notably, spousal support is viewed as a temporary measure to allow a spouse
to obtain necessary education or work skills to re-enter the job market and
become self-supporting.162 This is evidenced by the fact that if alimony or
maintenance is awarded, “the remarriage of the former spouse shall relieve the
spouse obligated to pay support from further payment of alimony to the former
spouse from the date of the remarriage.”163 The fact that maintenance is
temporary reflects the state’s interest in privatization of divorce and its
financial consequences.164
3. Exceptions to Traditional Divorce Law
Divorce, like marriage, is part of a broad category of domestic relations
regulated by the states.165 However, the state’s right to regulate divorce is not
absolute, as there are constitutional parameters to the state’s ability to regulate
divorce.166
a. The Right to Divorce
Although the state regulates divorce, and it is a party to the marriage
contract, there are limits to the state’s ability to prevent a couple from

159. Meservey v. Meservey, 841 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Goller v.
Goller, 758 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
160. § 452.335.
161. Id.
162. Kruger & Boxerman, supra note 155, at 223.
163. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.075 (2012).
164. Singer, supra note 106, at 1470.
165. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 298 (1942).
166. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (“In some cases, however, this Court has
held that the Federal Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for
certain formal family relationships. In those cases, as in the state cases, the Court has emphasized
the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a
counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.”).
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dissolving their marriage. For instance, in Bodie v. Connecticut the Supreme
Court held that there is a right to divorce.167 The Court held that due process of
law prohibits a state from denying access to courts to those seeking judicial
dissolution of their marriages because they were unable to pay court fees.168
Whereas the right to marry169 protects an individual’s right to enter a marriage,
the right to divorce protects the individual’s right to exit the marriage.170 The
right to marry has been upheld using the equal protection clause, and the right
to divorce has been upheld based on due process.171 Thus, the concern with
marriage is access to the institution of marriage, while the concern with
divorce is access to the courthouse in order to exit the institution of marriage.
Therefore, the right to marry and the right to divorce must be analyzed and
applied separately.
b. Recognizing a Marriage for Limited Purposes
There are times when the state and the court have opposed a form of
marriage for public policy reasons, but recognized divorce for similar public
policy reasons. For instance, a “putative marriage” allows a null marriage to be
considered a true marriage for a limited purpose.172 The putative marriage
doctrine was developed to correct injustice occurring if civil effects were not
allowed “to flow to a party to a null marriage who believes in good faith that
he or she is validly married.”173 Also, polygamy is illegal in the United
States.174 However, in Parker v. Parker, a Connecticut case, a husband had remarried before his first marriage was officially dissolved, so in effect he was
married to two women at the same time.175 Since polygamy is illegal,
technically, the second marriage could have been considered void, but the
second wife sought an annulment with alimony.176 The husband did not deny
marrying his second wife, but argued that the second marriage was never valid,
thus he felt that he should not have to pay alimony.177 The court ultimately
held that the second marriage was void and granted the annulment, but still
provided relief to the second wife by ordering the husband to pay her
alimony.178 This is an example of a court successfully recognizing a marriage

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
Id.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
Bodie, 401 U.S. at 382–83.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985).
See id.
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946).
Parker v. Parker, 270 A.2d 94 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970).
See id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
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for the limited purpose of applying divorce law. This case implies that
although a form of marriage, like polygamy, may be against public policy and
considered harmful to families, applying divorce law to the dispute and
requiring the husband to pay alimony to the wife did not hurt the family, but
rather reduced the overall harm to the family. If the court had not ordered the
husband to pay alimony, the wife would likely not have been economically
self-sufficient.
Also, although the state of Missouri does not recognize common-law
marriages,179 the state makes several public policy exceptions to this rule. First,
Missouri courts will recognize a common-law marriage if it was given legal
effect by another state.180 Also, if a spouse is awarded alimony or maintenance
during a divorce proceeding, the remarriage of that spouse “relieve[s] the
spouse obligated to pay support from further payment of alimony to the former
spouse from the date of the remarriage.”181 The reason for this public policy
exception is that maintenance is designed to be temporary.182 Importantly,
although the state of Missouri does not allow common-law marriages, if the
spouse receiving maintenance enters into a marriage-like relationship, the court
will recognize this as a common-law marriage for the sole purpose of
terminating the maintenance order.183 This further illustrates the state’s
underlying belief in independence and autonomy.
Here, Part II has considered the overall goals of divorce and has
demonstrated that the state has a strong interest in providing efficient,
effective, and consistent relief to parties seeking dissolution. Overall,
Missouri’s divorce law reflects an overarching belief in not only providing
equitable relief to couples as they divide their assets, but also in privatizing the
financial consequences of divorce.
III. SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS & FAMILY LAW
This section will briefly consider the legality of same-sex marriage
throughout the United States, specifically focusing on the interstate recognition
of same-sex marriages and the problem of same-sex divorce when it is the
public policy of a state not to allow same-sex marriages.
179. See MO. REV. STAT. § 451.040 (2000) (“Common-law marriages shall be null and
void.”).
180. Pope v. Pope, 520 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming a divorce granted by
a trial court where the parties were not formally married, but, since the state of Kansas recognized
their common law marriage, the state of Missouri did also since the parties were now Missouri
residents).
181. § 452.075.
182. See § 452.335.
183. Lombardo v. Lombardo, 120 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that a wife
entering a common-law marriage could result in the termination of maintenance; however, the
case was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction).
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Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States184

Historically, in the United States at least, marriage has included one man
and one woman.185 Thus, when Richard Baker and James McConnell, a samesex couple, applied for a marriage license in Hennepin County, Minnesota on
May 18, 1970,186 the state of Minnesota denied their application.187 Although
their constitutional challenge was also ultimately rejected, Baker v. Nelson188
made history by becoming the first reported judicial challenge to a state law
limiting marriage to a male and a female.189 Since then, there has been
extensive same-sex debate and litigation over the past forty years.190 As of
February 2012, nine jurisdictions now permit same-sex marriage, including:
Massachusetts,191 Connecticut,192 Vermont,193 New Hampshire,194 Iowa,195
Washington, D.C.,196 New York,197 Washington,198 and California.199

184. For a history of same-sex marriage in other cultures see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (1993) (“Same-sex unions have been a
valuable institution for most of human history and in most known cultures.”).
185. See supra Part II.A. for discussion of purposes and benefits of marriage.
186. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971) (upholding the denial of an
application for a marriage license because both applicants were male).
187. Id.
188. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (dismissing the appeal on the grounds that
the case failed to raise a substantial federal question).
189. NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 1, at 3.
190. Id.
191. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that the state’s ban on same-sex marriage violated Massachusetts’s constitution and giving state
legislature 180 days to comply with its ruling).
192. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411–12 (Conn. 2008) (holding
that law restricting marriage to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couples’ state
constitutional equal protection rights); see also Robert D. McFadden, Gay Marriage is Ruled
Legal in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A1.
193. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2009) (“Marriage is the legally recognized union
of two people.”).
194. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2012) (“Marriage is the legally recognized
union of 2 people. Any person who otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of this chapter
may marry any other eligible person regardless of gender.”); see also Abby Goodnough, New
Hampshire Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19.
195. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (holding that an Iowa statute
denying gay and lesbian people the right to marry violated the equal protection law promised by
the Iowa Constitution); see also Keith B. Richburg, Iowa Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage–Ban
Violated Constitutional Rights, State Supreme Court Rules, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2009, at A3.
196. D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2001) (“Any person may enter into a marriage in the District of
Columbia with another person, regardless of gender . . . .”); see also Ian Urbina, District of
Columbia Backs Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A28.
197. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011) (“A marriage that is otherwise valid shall
be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.”); see
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However, the majority of the United States only recognizes marriage between
a male and a female.200
B.

The Ban on Same-Sex Marriages in the United States

The main argument against same-sex marriage is that the State has an
interest in preserving the “traditional” institution of marriage.201 This
traditional marriage argument includes the assertion that “marriage is uniquely
and crucially the legal site for procreation” and that heterosexual unions are
optimal for procreation “since same-sex couples cannot have procreative
sexual intercourse.”202 Consequently, same-sex marriage has been viewed as a
threat to the entire institution of traditional marriage.203
1. The Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)
In 1996, the federal government responded to the growing demand for
legal recognition of same-sex marriages by affecting the Defense of Marriage
Act (“DOMA”), which defined marriage, for the purposes of federal law, as a
union between one man and one woman.204 Although the United States
Constitution, in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, establishes that states must
recognize other state’s “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings,”205
DOMA explicitly addresses this constitutional requirement by excluding samesex marriages from the acts that other states must recognize.206 Thus, not only
does DOMA prevent any sort of federal recognition of same-sex relationships,
also Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming
Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A1.
198. Same Sex Marriage, 2011–2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199–200 (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010). See also William Yardley, Washington State Senate Passes Gay
Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, at A13.
199. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433–34 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the California
Constitution “guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive constitutional rights as oppositesex couples” including the right to marry); but see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008)
(defining marriage as “between a man and a woman” only); but see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Constitutional Amendment violates the
Equal Protection Clause by excluding same-sex couples from marriage), aff’d, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
200. NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 1, at 2–3.
201. Patrick Busch, Is Same-Sex Marriage a Threat to Traditional Marriages?: How Courts
Struggle with the Question, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 143, 143–44 (2011).
202. Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1375, 1438 (2010).
203. Busch, supra note 201, at 144.
204. The Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (stating that “the word
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and
the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
205. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
206. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
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but it also allows states to refuse to recognize legal status that same-sex
couples received from another state.207 Since its enactment, legal scholars have
criticized the constitutionality of DOMA.208
2. Mini-DOMAs Enacted by the States
Although DOMA allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages,
it does not prevent each state from enacting legislation legalizing same-sex
marriage or recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages.209 In response,
twenty-eight states210 adopted amendments to their constitutions limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples, while twelve states adopted similar statutes
prohibiting same-sex marriage.211 Also, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island did not pass legislation, but have otherwise interpreted marriage to mean
a man and a woman only.212 The wording of each “mini-DOMA” changes
from state to state. Some mini-DOMAs simply define “marriage” as being
between a man and a woman, thus prohibiting same-sex couples to marry.213
However, many mini-DOMAs indicate that same-sex marriages contracted out
of state will not be “recognized.”214 Others require non-recognition of all
207. NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 1, at 11.
208. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and Doma: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 2007 (1997); Mark
P. Strasser, Doma and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1011 (2010).
209. NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 1, at 4.
210. Id. (outlining the number of states that originally adopted mini-DOMAs though some of
these were subsequently overturned by state supreme courts).
211. Id.
212. See N.M. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 11-01 (2011) (stating that in New Mexico the term
marriage means that between man and woman); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200, 224 (N.J.
2006) (holding in New Jersey same-sex marriage is not a “fundamental right” protected under the
Constitution, but giving state legislature 180 days to provide “committed same-sex couples, on
equal terms, the full rights and benefits enjoyed by heterosexual married couples”); Chambers v.
Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 964 (R.I. 2007) (reasoning that in Rhode Island the meaning of the term
“marriage” only includes opposite-sex couples).
213. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“[M]arriage may exist only between one man and
one woman.”); ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 1; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 202 (2011); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 572-3 (2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (2011); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; N.D.
CONST. art. XI, § 28; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; WYO. STAT. ANN. §
20-1-101 (2011).
214. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1 (“Only a union of one man and one woman shall
be valid or recognized as a marriage.”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; KY. CONST. § 233A; MONT.
CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; OHIO CONST. art. XV, §
11; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; KAN.
CONST. art. XV, § 16; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A; TENN. CONST.
art. XI, § 18; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A,
§ 701 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2011); W. VA.
CODE. § 48-2-603 (2011).
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same-sex relationships for any purpose.215 Mini-DOMAs successfully prevent
evasive marriages, where citizens know same-sex marriage is prohibited by
their home state, but obtain a same-sex marriage in another state and return
home immediately after.216 However, nearly 150,000 same-sex couples
reported being married in 2010.217 Not all circumstances involving interstate
marriage recognition involve evasive marriages. For instance, an employer
might transfer a same-sex spouse to a state that does not recognize their samesex marriage. This would result in a “migratory” same-sex marriage, which,
although lawfully obtained and not “evasive,” would still not be recognized.218
Equally worrisome, a married same-sex couple might be traveling through a
state that does not recognize their same-sex marriage when they get in a car
accident, resulting in a same-sex spouse not being able to be with their spouse
in the hospital. Thus, “mini-DOMAs” not only prohibit same-sex marriage
from occurring in a state, but they also deny legal effect to valid same-sex
marriages contracted in other states for any purpose.219
C. Same-Sex Divorce
It should come as no surprise that, like opposite-sex couples, same-sex
couples break up.220 Same-sex couples seeking dissolution “do not say that
they want to marry so that if they split up the property division and support
rules that accompany divorce will apply to them.”221 Rather, like most couples
that marry, they do not expect to divorce.222 Yet, “the different rules for
215. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03 (Any “union replicating marriage between persons
of the same sex” shall be “considered and treated in all respects as having no legal force or effect”
in the state of Alabama); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; MICH. CONST. art.
I, § 25; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
216. See Melissa Meinzer, Same-sex Couples in St. Louis Can Get Married in Iowa. They Just
Can’t Ever Get Divorced., RIVERFRONT TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.riverfronttimes.
com/2010-12-02/news/same-sex-divorce-st-louis-missouri/ (noting that “[s]ince 2009, when an
Iowa Supreme Court ruling extended marriage rights to all unrelated adults, with no residency
requirement, nearly ninety couples [from St. Louis] have taken the long bus ride from St. Louis to
Iowa City with Show Me No Hate, [a] St. Louis-based marriage-equity group”).
217. Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex Married Couples, supra note 2.
218. Considering that about 3 percent of Americans move to a different state each year, this
could mean that as many as 4,500 individuals with same-sex marriages will migrate this year. See
Paul Overberg, Millions More Americans Move to New States, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2007,
10:23AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-11-29-Mobility_N.htm.
219. See Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, in SAME-SEX
DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 137, 144 (2006).
220. See Clyde Haberman, After Same-Sex Marriage, Same-Sex Divorce, N.Y. TIMES (June
27, 2011, 8:34 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/after-same-sex-marriagesame-sex-divorce/.
221. NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES
UNDER THE LAW 175 (2008).
222. Id.
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settling money issues at the end of a marriage versus an unmarried relationship
can cause indefensible hardship.”223 Although the American Law Institute
recommends the inclusion of same-sex couples and includes “domestic
partnerships” in its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,224 states with
mini-DOMAs do not have to dissolve same-sex marriages or other domestic
partnerships.225 These states, that do not allow same-sex marriages, have been
handling same-sex divorce with one of three possible approaches.
1. Complete Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
Although, “[y]ou would think that people who are against gay marriage
would love nothing more than to help a gay, married couple divorce,”226 some
states have already made it clear that they will, under no circumstance,
recognize a same-sex marriage—even if the purpose of recognizing the
marriage is to dissolve it—specifically Texas,227 Rhode Island,228 Oklahoma,229
Pennsylvania,230 and Georgia.231 Thus, when a legally married same-sex
couple moves to one of these states, technically they are no longer married
because that state considers their original marriage to be void—even if it was
legally contracted in another state.232 Since they do not “recognize” the

223. Id.
224. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 (2000).
225. See Koppelman, supra note 219, at 105.
226. Forget About Gay Marriage, What About Gay Divorce?, POL. IRONY (Oct. 16, 2009,
12:27 AM), http://politicalirony.com/2009/10/16/forget-about-gay-marriage-what-about-gaydivorce/.
227. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
Texas state court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction required to adjudicate same-sex divorce
petition).
228. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 974 (R.I. 2007) (holding that Rhode Island state
court was without jurisdiction to entertain divorce petition involving same sex couple married in
Massachusetts).
229. O’Darling v. O’Darling, 188 P.3d 137, 139 (Ok. 2008) (vacating Oklahoma trial court’s
grant of dissolution because same-sex couple identified themselves with their initials only and
“failed to disclose controlling legal authority regarding same-sex marriage in Oklahoma.”).
230. Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 563 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010) (“[B]ased on the law in
Pennsylvania as it currently exists, [we] cannot grant a divorce to [this same-sex couple]. Their
marriage, perhaps considered valid in Massachusetts and some other states, is not recognized in
Pennsylvania. Without a legally recognizable marriage, relief under the Divorce Code is simply
not available.”).
231. GA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction to grant a
divorce or separate maintenance with respect to any such relationship or otherwise to consider or
rule on any of the parties’ respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such
relationship.”).
232. See id.
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marriage, it does not exist.233 Ultimately, these states are concerned with the
consequences of giving legal effect to same-sex marriage for any reason.234
However, a couple cannot just rely on the state’s Constitution or statute
making their marriage void for all purposes in that state, because the marriage
would not be void in the other nine jurisdiction that legally recognize the
marriage. For instance, Lisa Lunt married her wife in Massachusetts in 2008,
they later moved to Rhode Island, where they cannot get a divorce.235 Lunt is
now concerned that if she is not able to get a divorce, her ex-wife could move
to a state that recognizes same-sex marriage and claim half of her retirement.236
Thus, she argues that the state should at least grant an annulment stating that
her marriage is over.
Some couples have the option of returning to the state that married them to
request a divorce. For instance, the state of California allows same-sex couples
that were married in California to divorce in California without establishing
residency, as long as they can prove that their state of residence will not
dissolve the marriage.237 Although California law typically requires that at
least one of the parties be a resident of the state for six months and of a county
for three months prior to filing petition,238 there is an exception for same-sex
couples.239
Importantly, other states that allow same-sex marriage have yet to pass a
law like California's. Thus, the domicile requirements in New York,240 Iowa,241
Connecticut,242
Massachusetts,243
New
Hampshire,244
Vermont,245

233. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. App. 2010). (“[S]ame-sex
marriages have no legal effect in Texas.”).
234. Because “a divorce proceeding would ‘give effect’ to a same-sex marriage.” Id. at 666.
235. Tovia Smith, Gay Divorce Higher Hurdle than Marriage, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 20,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/20/137674268/gay-divorce-a-higher-hurdle-than-marriage.
236. Id.
237. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2320 (2011) (“A judgment for dissolution, nullity, or legal
separation of a marriage between persons of the same sex may be entered, even if neither spouse
is a resident . . . if [t]he marriage was entered in California” and “[n]either party to the marriage
resides in a jurisdiction that will dissolve the marriage.”).
238. See id. (“[A] judgment of dissolution of marriage may not be entered unless one of the
parties to the marriage has been a resident of this state for six months.”).
239. See id.
240. Although New York has no residency requirement for obtaining a marriage, there is a
ninety-day residency requirement for obtaining a divorce. See Haberman, supra note 220.
241. Meinzer, supra note 216 (noting that “[a]ny two non-related adults—regardless of
gender—can marry in Iowa, with no waiting period to establish residency . . . . Yet in Missouri,
same-sex couples are expressly prohibited from marrying. Nor does the state recognize same-sex
marriages performed in other states.”).
242. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-44 (2011) (requiring that before divorce will be granted
one of the parties must have been a resident of Connecticut for at least twelve months, or if one of
the parties was domiciled in Connecticut at the time of the marriage and returned to the state
“with the intention of permanently remaining”).
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Washington,246 and Washington, D.C.247 would prevent a same-sex couple
from returning to the state for the sole purpose of divorcing.
For instance, when Massachusetts became the first state to legalize samesex marriage,248 there was concern that Massachusetts would become the go-to
state for quick same-sex marriages and divorces.249 So, to avoid becoming “the
Las Vegas”250 of same-sex marriage and divorce, the state decided to limit the
ability of out-of-state couples to marry and divorce in Massachusetts without
first establishing domicile.251 This means a couple who gets married in
Massachusetts and subsequently moves to another state that does not recognize
same-sex marriage, cannot go back to Massachusetts for the purpose of getting
a divorce.252
2. Equitable Remedies for Unmarried Cohabitants
Another approach, popularly explored by legal scholars, is to provide an
equitable remedy to the legally married couple without recognizing the samesex marriage or applying traditional family law.253 For instance, a state might

243. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 4–5 (2003) (limiting divorce to a Plaintiff who has
lived in Massachusetts for one year at time of divorce, “unless it appears that Plaintiff has
removed into this commonwealth for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.”).
244. N.H. REV. STAT. § 458:5 (2011) (requiring both parties to be domiciled in New
Hampshire or one to be domiciled in New Hampshire for at least a year before commencing
divorce action).
245. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 592 (2011) (requiring six month residency before action for
divorce may be filed and twelve month residency before divorce will be granted).
246. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030 (2011) (requiring twelve month residency before
complaint for dissolution may be filed).
247. But see Same-Sex Divorce Bill Advances in D.C. Council, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
12, 2012, 9:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/same-sex-divorce-bill-adv_n_12
01592.html?view=print&comm_ref=false (“Supporters say the bill, the Civil Marriage
Dissolution Equality Amendment Act of 2011, is needed because states that don’t recognize
same-sex marriage have no legal mechanism to issue a divorce to gay or lesbian couples who
wish to dissolve their D.C. marriage through a divorce.”).
248. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003).
249. See Grossman, supra note 73, at 87.
250. See id.
251. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 4–5 (2003).
252. See Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 560 n.2 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010) (“Apparently,
the parties are not permitted to obtain a divorce in Massachusetts for failure to qualify under the
residency requirements, although the parties were permitted to be married there.”); Grossman,
supra note 73, at 89-100 (discussing the history of migratory divorce).
253. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis When Considering
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 699, 738–39 (2004); William A. Reppy, Jr., Choice of
Law Problems Arising when Unmarried Cohabitants Change Domicile, 55 SMU L. REV. 273,
274–75 (2002) (examining “five theoretical bases for recognizing or precluding property claims
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refuse to admit that a legal marriage occurred, but admit that a binding contract
to live together and divide property in a certain way occurred. Thus, the state
may enforce that marriage contract by applying contract law.254 This approach
allows the state to divide the couple’s property without granting a traditional
divorce, and therefore not legally acknowledge or address the validity of the
marriage.255 Likewise, if a couple’s marriage is not recognized by the state, the
relationship might be described in legal terms as unmarried cohabitants.
However, it is well-established that “legal rights and obligations may arise
from the conduct of the parties with respect to one another, even though they
have created no formal document or agreement setting forth such an
undertaking.”256 The development of cohabitation rights can be traced back to
Marvin v. Marvin, where the California Supreme Court considered the
possibility of applying implied contract theory to property division of
unmarried cohabitation relationships.257 In fact, courts have applied both
express and implied contract remedies to “resolve disputes about property and
financial arrangements arising out of cohabitation relationships.”258 Another
approach is to “utilize contract law and principles of unjust enrichment to
enforce written and oral express contracts, validate implied contracts, impose
constructive and resulting trusts, and award quantum meruit.”259 By
recognizing a valid contract, courts can enforce the private agreements of
parties without public policy objections to same-sex marriage. Some states use
restitution to settle claims under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, however
this would limit recovery to the actual amount contributed.260 Other “states use
multiple doctrines to form their approach to the dissolution of cohabitation
relationships.”261 For instance, “Texas and Minnesota fold cohabitating
couples' agreements to share property into their statute of frauds, requiring
such agreements to be in writing.”262
It is also possible that in the case of same-sex marriages courts may go
beyond cohabitation contracts for cohabitation disputes and apply principles of
by one cohabitant against the other: express contract, implied-in-fact contract, negative status,
positive status not founded on a contract, and positive status arising out of contract.”).
254. John M. Yarwood, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Mini-Doma States, Migratory Same-Sex
Marriage, Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1356–
57 (2009) (addressing the division of property upon the dissolution of a same-sex marriage,
focusing on married same-sex couples who have migrated to a state that clearly defines marriage
as between a man and a woman).
255. Id. at 1387.
256. AM. LAW INST., supra note 224, at § 6.02.
257. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 672 (1976).
258. Singer, supra note 106, 1450–51.
259. Yarwood, supra note 254, at 1371–72.
260. Id. at 1376.
261. Id. at 1372.
262. Id. at 1373.
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business or partnership law.263 For instance, in the case of Ah Leong v. Ah
Leong, a man and woman were living together as husband and wife, but they
had not married.264 The court reasoned that the couple had “in effect entered a
joint adventure for mutual benefit of themselves and their family,” creating a
quasi partnership.265 As a result of this partnership, the court held that the wife
was entitled to legal property accumulated as a result of their joint venture.266
3. Recognizing a “Marriage” for a Limited Purpose
More and more states seem to be recognizing the need for same-sex
divorce, even if they do not allow same-sex marriage. For instance, in
Christiansen v. Christiansen267 a Wyoming court held that the trial court had
subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex marriage that was lawfully
entered into in Canada. 268 In making this decision, the court began by noting,
"district courts are endowed with broad subject-matter jurisdiction.”269
Although the Wyoming law defines marriage as a contract between a male and
a female,270 another Wyoming statute states that “[a]ll marriage contracts
which are valid by the laws of the country in which contracted are valid in this
state.”271 The court reasoned that one statute related to the creation of
marriage, while the other related to the recognition of marriage.272 The court
emphasized that:
[R]ecognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of
entertaining a divorce proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in
Wyoming against allowing the creation of same-sex marriages. A divorce
proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing
relationship. Indeed, accepting that a valid marriage exists plays no role except
as a condition precedent to granting a divorce. After the condition precedent is
met, the laws regarding divorce apply. Laws regarding marriage play no
273
role.

263. Singer, supra note 106, 1450–51.
264. See Ah Leong v. Ah Leong, 28 Haw. 581, 585 (1925).
265. Id. at 586.
266. Id.
267. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153 (Wyo. 2011).
268. Id. at 157; see also Frederick Hertz, Wyoming Opens the Doors to Same-Sex Divorce,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 9, 2011, 5:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frederickhertz/wyoming-opens-the-doors-t_b_874365.html.
269. Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 155.
270. Id. at 155 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2011)).
271. Id. (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-111 (2011)).
272. Id. at 156 (noting that the statute defining marriage between a man and a woman did not
speak to recognizing same-sex marriages).
273. Id. (noting that the women seeking to dissolve their marriage were not seeking “to
enforce any right incident to the status of being married.”).
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Similarly, in New Jersey, in Hammond v. Hammond,274 the court applied
New Jersey divorce law to dissolution of a same-sex marriage obtained in
Canada. It is worth noting that granting a same-sex dissolution is not as easy
for states with mini-DOMAs expressly prohibiting recognition of same-sex
marriage for any purpose. In that case, to avoid ruling on these constitutional
questions, “a judge would have to find that an expansive mini-DOMA did not
operate to deny the divorce.”275 This would mean interpreting a mini-DOMA
banning the recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages for any purpose, to
still allow “the recognition of such a marriage for the sole purpose of
divorce.”276 However, there is more room for interpretation in states with miniDOMAs simply defining marriage as between a man and a woman.
For instance, West Virginia has applied divorce law to a civil union.277 In
one case, the parties entered a civil union in Vermont and sought dissolution in
a West Virginia family court.278 Before deciding to apply traditional
dissolution laws, the court looked to the Vermont Statute outlining the couple’s
union which stated that when two eligible persons had established a
relationship pursuant to that statute they could “receive the benefits and
protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses.”279 Although West
Virginia has a mini-DOMA stating that any act of another state that treats
members of the same-sex as married should not be given effect in West
Virginia, the court noted that in Vermont a civil union is not a marriage.280
Therefore, the mini-DOMA did not prevent the court from applying dissolution
laws to the civil union.281
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New York has held that a trial court had
“equity jurisdiction” to grant a dissolution in the case of a same-sex couple
who were not married but entered into a civil union in Vermont.282 Although
same-sex marriage is recognized in New York, there was no legislative

274. See ACLU-NJ Wins Case Allowing Same-Sex Couple to Divorce in NJ, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION N. J., http://www.aclu-nj.org/news/2009/02/05/aclu-nj-wins-case-allowingsame-sex-couple-to-divorce-in-nj (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); Arthur S. Leonard, New Jersey
Marriage Recognition Ruling, LEONARD LINK, http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonard
link/2009/02/new-jersey.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
275. Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV.
73, 105, 121 (2011) (concluding that “the legislature is in a better position to make divorce
available to same-sex couples than a court.”).
276. Id.
277. In re Marriage of Gorman and Gump, No. 02-D-292, at 22 (W.Va. Jan. 3, 2003)
(applying divorce law to dissolve a civil union where the parties were “citizens of West Virginia
in need of a judicial remedy to dissolve a legal relationship created by the laws of another state.”).
278. Cox, supra note 253, at 738–39 (discussing facts of case).
279. Id. at 739.
280. Id. at 739–40.
281. Id.
282. Dickerson v. Thompson, 88 A.D.3d 121, 123–24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
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mechanism outlined allowing a court to dissolve a civil union created in
another state.283 The court reasoned that there was no remedy at law in New
York or in Vermont since residency requirements prevented the Plaintiff from
getting a dissolution in Vermont.284 Since there would be no court competent
to provide plaintiff the requested relief, she would therefore be left without a
remedy.
IV. SAME-SEX COUPLES IN MISSOURI
A.

The Status of Same-Sex Relationships in Missouri

In 2004, the Missouri General Assembly submitted to Missouri voters a
constitutional amendment to amend Missouri’s Bill of Rights to define
marriage in the Missouri Constitution285 as existing “only between a man and a
woman.”286 Thus, it is the “public policy of this state [Missouri] to recognize
marriage only between a man and a woman. . . . Any purported marriage not
between a man and a woman is invalid.”287 Thus, Missouri will not recognize a
marriage between persons of the same sex even if the marriage was valid
where it was contracted. Although Missouri does not allow same-sex marriage,
there are situations involving domestic relations when Missouri does recognize
the rights of partners in same-sex relationships. For instance, the Adult Abuse
Act outlines the rights of a victim of domestic violence and defines the terms
“family” and “household member” as any “adult who is or has been in a
continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the
victim.”288 Until 1992, the statute contained opposite-sex language, which
meant that same-sex couples were not covered. However, since the 1993
amendment the act has been interpreted to include same-sex partners.289
This Note now discusses three approaches taken by states in other
jurisdictions and considers which would best fit Missouri’s public policy to
limit marriage to opposite-sex partners.

283. Id.
284. Id. at 124.
285. Alan Cooperman, Gay Marriage Ban in Mo. May Resonate Nationwide, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 2004, at A2 (noting that “Missouri’s referendum was the first opportunity for voters
anywhere in the country to take a stand on the issue.”).
286. MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (“That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall
exist only between a man and a woman.”).
287. MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2000).
288. § 455.010.
289. See David H. Dunlap, Trends in Adult Abuse and Child Protection, 66 UMKC L. REV. 1,
3 (1997) (explaining the significance of a 1993 amendment which, among other things, removed
the “opposite sex” restriction for all purposes). However, many states, such as Louisiana, still
define “household members” as “any person of the opposite sex presently or formerly living in
the same residence.” See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2011) (emphasis added).
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1. Complete Non-Recognition
a. “Return to Divorce” Clauses
Indeed, some scholars believe that lifting domicile requirements, like
California has done,290 is the solution to the same-sex divorce problem.291
However, there are several glaring problems with relying on the state that
granted the legal union to provide a means for dissolving it when the couple no
longer lives there. First, simply lifting domicile requirements only helps
individuals whose divorce is uncontested, meaning both parties must agree to
return to that state to get a divorce. This overlooks the possibility that one party
may be unwilling to return to the state. Also, domicile laws historically stem
from the state’s need to have jurisdiction over the individuals and their
property in order to enter judgments against them.292 The state or country of
domicile has the closest real public interest in a marriage293 because the
“[r]ules governing the inheritance of property, adoption, and child custody are
generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State.”294
Moreover, even “if same-sex couples obtain judgments in the context of
divorce or dissolution proceedings, other states would be constitutionally
compelled to award them recognition. . . . ‘DOMA purports to relieve the
states of a duty to enforce judgments related to same-sex marriages.’”295 Even
long before DOMA, in 1945, the Supreme Court held that the state of North
Carolina was not required to yield its policy because the state of Nevada
granted divorce decrees to North Carolina residents.296 In that case, a North
Carolina resident obtained a divorce in Nevada, which was known for having

290. See Frederick Hertz, Gay Divorce: SB651 Opens California Divorce Courts to NonResidents, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2011, 12:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
frederick-hertz/gay-divorce-california_b_1008002.html.
291. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Monroe L. Inker, Same-Sex Marriage and Divorce
Jurisdiction, 16 DIVORCE LITIG. 96, 101 (2004) (concluding that the best solution would be for
the state authorizing the marriage to alter their domicile requirements so that same-sex couples
who got married and moved away could come back briefly to dissolve the union).
292. Oppenheimer, supra note 275, at 82 (noting that “[e]ven if a same-sex couple succeeds
in divorcing in a state that recognizes their marriage, other states may not enforce divorce
obligations, such as alimony.”).
293. Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States’ Interest in the Marital Status of Their
Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 21 (2000).
294. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983).
295. Alexander V. Maugeri, The Missing Ingredient: How Oft-Overlooked Modern Conflict
of Laws Principles Will Dictate the Reach of Same-Sex Marriage in America, 30 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 325, 374 (2011) (noting that even “if same-sex couples obtain judgments in the
context of divorce or dissolution proceedings . . . DOMA purports to relieve the states of a duty to
enforce judgments related to same-sex marriages.”).
296. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945).
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more lenient domicile requirements at the time.297 According to the Court,
“North Carolina was entitled to find . . . that they did not acquire domicils in
Nevada and that the Nevada court was therefore without power to liberate the
petitioners from amenability to the laws of North Carolina governing domestic
relations.”298
Under our federal law system, divorce judgments are subject to full faith
and credit, however, judicial power to grant a divorce, as in personal
jurisdiction over parties, is based on the domicile of the parties. Thus, if a
resident seeks a divorce from another state, the home state could simply refuse
to enforce the dissolution order based on lack of jurisdiction over its citizen.299
And “[b]y refusing to recognize these marriages, states allow parties to flee in
order to avoid obligations arising from their divorce,” thus a spouse “could
dissolve a marriage in one state and avoid obligations to account for marital
assets by residing in another.”300
b. Voidness
Likewise, Missouri cannot simply rely on the fact that it does not recognize
same-sex marriage to effectively invalidate a same-sex marriage contracted
elsewhere.301 For instance, if a Missouri resident entered a legal same-sex
marriage in another state, but that relationship ended without obtaining a legal
divorce the other party living in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage
could exercise their marital rights over the Missouri resident’s property.302
Although Missouri may have decided not to recognize certain contracts legally
entered into in other states, this does not protect Missouri citizens from the
enforcement of those valid contracts by the other states. Moreover,
declarations of voidness do not provide any of the substantive benefits of
divorce, which, as discussed above, are more than beneficial to the individual
party to the marriage, but beneficial to society as a whole.303 Fortunately,
Missouri courts do not seem to be headed in the direction of complete nonrecognition.

297. Id. at 236.
298. Id. at 239. “A judgment in one State is conclusive upon the merits in every other State,
but only if the court of the first State had power to pass on the merits—had jurisdiction, that is, to
render the judgment.” Id. at 229.
299. Oppenheimer, supra note 275, at 113.
300. Danielle Johnson, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A Critical Analysis of Chambers v.
Ormiston and Why Divorce is an Incident of Marriage That Should Be Uniformly Recognized
Throughout the States, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 225, 244 (2010).
301. MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (“That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall
exist only between a man and a woman.”).
302. Oppenheimer, supra note 275, at 107.
303. Id.
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c. Annulment
In 2008, a same-sex couple was granted an annulment in Buchanan
County, Missouri.304 In that case, Charisse Sparks and Janet Sparks were
married in Massachusetts in 2005.305 On October 29, 2007, Charisse Sparks
filed for an annulment in the state of Missouri, where she lived.306 On April 1,
2008, Senator Delbert Scott filed an amicus brief asking the court not to
recognize the marriage for the purpose of granting an annulment because
recognizing the same-sex marriage for any reason would give legal effect to
the marriage.307 Notwithstanding, Judge Daniel Kellogg went through with the
annulment and on June 11, 2008 entered a simple order purporting that the
“marriage between Charisse Sparks and Janet Yolanda Sparks is hereby
annulled.”308 Although the filing of Senators Scott’s amicus brief was briefly
observed in the press, the outcome of the case received very little attention
overall.309 Regardless, this is a step in the direction of recognizing that
Missouri’s public policy of banning same-sex marriage does not preclude
Missouri from providing a forum for same-sex dissolution. Interestingly,
Missouri does not have a statute specifically addressing annulment.310 This
means that Missouri courts could consider incorporating equitable remedies
with annulments to provide some of the benefits of divorce to same-sex
couples.
2. Apply Other Law and Place An Undue Burden on the Courts
Without legalizing same-sex marriage, Missouri could instead apply other
types of law to equitably split up property acquired in a same-sex
“partnership.” In a way, Missouri could recognize its obligation to provide a
forum for dissolution of marriages and civil unions contracted elsewhere311 by
viewing same-sex marriage contracts as creating a “quasi-partnership” instead
of a marriage.312 Also, a court could reason that a marriage contract has the
same effect as a cohabitation contract, and apply contract law or treat the
marriage contract like a business partnership or joint venture and apply
partnership law.
304. Sparks v. Sparks, No. 07BU-CV04904 (Mo. Civ. Ct. June 11, 2008), available at
https://www.courts.mo.gov.
305. Meinzer, supra note 216.
306. Sparks, No. 07BU-CV04904.
307. Brief as Amici Curiae of Senator Delbert Scott at 3, Sparks v. Sparks, No. 07BUCV04904 (Mo. Civ. Ct. Apr. 1, 2008) (on file with author).
308. Sparks, No. 07BU-CV04904.
309. Meinzer, supra note 216.
310. But see MO. REV. STAT. § 452.300 (2006) (referring to a petition requesting “declaration
of invalidity of marriage,” thus implying that annulment is possible).
311. Ramais, supra note 108, at 1043.
312. See supra Part III.C.2.
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However, there are limitations on property division claims based on
agreements to share property.313 First, couples are not likely to plan to breakup or form express contracts concerning property division in case they do
break-up. Even if they intend to share their property, they may never expressly
determine the details of the division, which would be necessary to establish a
contract.314 The broader problem with applying other doctrines of law to
marriage is that a marriage is more than a business or a contract.315 By
providing relief at equity, the court must consider the facts of each marriage
and could decide each case differently—leading to unpredictable results.316
This approach would make it hard for parties, and their attorneys, to anticipate
how the court would interpret each incident of marriage.317
Most importantly, this approach would reinvent the wheel. The extensive
development of the field of family law already includes the application of
contract law and business law, as well as “constitutional law, property law, tort
law, civil procedure, statutory regulations, equitable remedies, and, of course,
marital property and support rights.”318 The entire field of family law has
developed to relieve the court from the burdensome task of coming up with an
individualized equitable remedy for each case-by-case situation.319 Not only
would this waste the court’s time, but the results would also be inconsistent.
Also, contract law and business law were not created with the same goals
and purposes of divorce law, though divorce law already incorporates many
elements of each of these fields. As discussed in Parts I and II, the public
policy goals of marriage and divorce law are to promote and protect the family,
whereas legal doctrines related to business or contract law may focus on other
factors, such as the market or encouraging new businesses.320 Of course these
approaches do overlap, and over time they have developed, through appeals,
and the kinks have been worked out. Thus, applying business law or contract
law to a same-sex divorce would not only be less effective than family law at
achieving Missouri’s public policy goals for divorce, but it would also be less
efficient for Missouri and unnecessarily burden the judicial system.321

313. Yarwood, supra note 254, at 1375.
314. Id.
315. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 50, at 14 (discussing the ways in which marriage is “more
than a mere contractual relationship.”).
316. Johnson, supra note 300, at 234–35.
317. See Andrew Koppelman, Choice of Law Rules: The Options, in SAME-SEX DIFFERENT
STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 82, 94 (2006).
318. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.
319. Id.
320. See supra Parts I & II.
321. See Yarwood, supra note 254, at 1387.
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3. Recognize Same-Sex Marriage for a Limited Purpose
As far back as 1877, the Supreme Court recognized that the state has an
“absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation
between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
dissolved.”322 Thus, an individual’s home state rightfully bears the burden of
resolving problems “arising when one of its residents seeks to dissolve a
marriage considered void or invalid under the laws of that state” by providing a
forum for dissolution.323
It has been said that “[m]arriage carries with it a huge array of
incidents.”324 For instance, there are “more than a thousand federal statutes in
which marital status is a factor,” and state law has a broad range of marital
rights and responsibilities including “family dissolution, adoption, domestic
violence, liability for family expenses, taxation, healthcare decision-making,
inheritance, the right to sue for wrongful death, eligibility for welfare benefits,
[and] health insurance.”325 Historically, in the case of divorce, “uniform
marriage acts were designed to mimic some of the benefits of uniformity
without fully achieving it.”326 Thus, uniformity was sought in the form of
marriage recognition, not marriage per se.327 The “purpose was to limit the
impact of one state's marriage laws on any other state.”328 This approach is
described as using “choice of law rules for marriage.”329 The court is charged
with considering the facts of each particular case, considering possible legal
remedies, and analyzing the policies behind each remedy before deciding
whether the couple should be viewed as married for that purpose.330 “If the
state's interest is in prohibiting ongoing offensive marriages, such limited
recognition makes sense.”331
Also, “[p]arties that are domiciled in a state generally own property in that
state; so, the state will have proper jurisdiction over both parties, such that
child or spousal support may be awarded.”332 Undoubtedly, the Missouri
legislature may be anxious about the idea of allowing same-sex divorce,
perhaps for fear that anything related to the legal recognition of same-sex
marriages is a “slippery slope” that will inevitably lead to the legalization of
same-sex marriage. However, if the state has different public policy reasons
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1877).
Ramais, supra note 108, at 1038.
See Koppelman, supra note 317, at 93.
Id. at 93–94.
Grossman, supra note 73, at 103.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 300, at 233–35.
Id. at 233.
Oppenheimer, supra note 275, at 105.
Johnson, supra note 300, at 247.
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related to the “right to divorce” and the “right to marry,” then these rights must
be analyzed separately. It is claimed that the policy behind banning same-sex
marriage is not intended to impede on the civil rights of individuals who are
homosexual, but rather the public policy against same-sex marriage is simply
about ensuring the preservation of society through the promotion of oppositesex marriage, which supports procreation.333 Even assuming, arguendo, that
this was a valid state interest, denying a person who is homosexual the right to
divorce does not serve the same public policy objective. Rather, Missouri’s
family law doctrine reflects the state’s interest in protecting individuals during
the divorce process by equitably dividing property and privatizing
dependency.334 None of the traditional goals of divorce can be achieved by
refusing to dissolve same-sex marriages. Instead of focusing on whether the
individual has a “right to divorce,” Missouri courts should instead focus on the
state’s interest in divorce and the public policy objectives that are overlooked
in refusing to grant same-sex divorces.
If Missouri allowed same-sex divorce, Missouri could continue to control
who may enter into a marriage, while simply allowing same-sex couples to exit
marriages. As discussed in Part II, there are times when jurisdictions with
similar public policy beliefs have recognized a marriage for the purpose of
dissolution without recognizing the validity of that type of marriage.335
Likewise, if same-sex marriage was recognized for the limited purpose of
divorce, “the court can confine its consideration of the relationship so as to
avoid addressing the validity of the underlying marriage.”336 Moreover,
recognition of same-sex marriages “for the limited purpose of issuing a divorce
does not necessarily advance the cause for broader recognition of such
relationships in other contexts.”337
V. CONCLUSION
Recognizing a same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of granting a
same-sex divorce would efficiently dissolve same-sex marriages in a way that
optimally benefits society, while protecting Missouri’s interest in regulating
who may enter and exit marriage. The goal of Missouri’s ban on same-sex
marriage is to promote opposite-sex marriage, which supports procreation and
the privatization of dependency. Likewise, the goal of divorce in Missouri is to
ensure the equitable division of the family unit and promote self-sufficiency,

333. Busch, supra note 201, at 144.
334. See supra Part II.B.2.
335. See supra Part II.B.2.
336. Johnson, supra note 300, at 246 (“The ability to legally end a marriage validly
performed in another state is an incident of that marriage that should be available uniformly
across the states, regardless of whether that state disagrees with the underlying marriage.”).
337. Ramais, supra note 108, at 1043.
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which also privatizes dependency. These goals are consistent, thus a public
policy allowing same-sex divorce would be consistent with Missouri’s public
policy not to allow same-sex marriage. Therefore, Missouri should adopt a
policy that allows courts to grant same-sex divorces regardless of whether or
not the state allows same-sex marriage.
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